Most of what we saw in the Snowden leaks was about methodology. We saw very little about what the NSA actually produces. Here we're actually seeing examples of what the NSA provides to policymakers. It's a useful perspective.
These are also from the Snowden leaks and they detail far more than just methodology, but rather examples of the actual information they're collecting - courtesy of Microsoft.
July 31, 2012
Microsoft (MS) began encrypting web-based chat with the introduction of the new outlook.com service. This new Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption effectively cut off collection of the new service for FAA 702 and likely 12333 (to some degree) for the Intelligence Community (IC). MS, working with the FBI, developed a surveillance capability to deal with the new SSL. These solutions were successfully tested and went live 12 Dec 2012. The SSL solution was applied to all current FISA and 702/PRISM requirements - no changes to UTT tasking procedures were required. The SSL solution does not collect server-based voice/video or file transfers. The MS legacy collection system will remain in place to collect voice/video and file transfers. As a result there will be some duplicate collection of text-based chat from the new and legacy systems which will be addressed at a later date. An increase in collection volume as a result of this solution has already been noted by CES.
March 15, 2013
SSO's PRISM program began tasking all Microsoft PRISM selectors to Skype because Skype allows users to log in using account identifiers in addition to Skype usernames. Until now, PRISM would not collect any Skype data when a user logged in using anything other than the Skype username which resulted in missing collection; this action will mitigate that. In fact, a user can create a Skype account using any e-mail address with any domain in the world. UTT does not currently allow analysts to task these non-Microsoft e-mail addresses to PRISM, however, SSO intends to fix that this summer. In the meantime, NSA, FBI and Dept of Justice coordinated over the last six months to gain approval for PRINTAURA to send all current and future Microsoft PRISM selectors to Skype. This resulted in about 9800 selectors being sent to Skype and successful collection has been received which otherwise would have been missed.
March 7, 2014
PRISM now collects Microsoft Skydrive data as part of PRISM'S standard Stored Communications collection package for a tasked FISA Amendments Act Section 702 (FAA702) selector. This means that analysts will no longer have to make a special request to SSO for this - a process step that many analysts may not have known about. This new capability will result in a much more complete and timely collection response from SSO for our Enterprise customers. This success is the result of the FBI working for many months with Microsoft to get this tasking and collection solution established.
All of what you just provided are examples of methodology. What GabrielF00 was referencing is something like "Prime Minister Alice contacted Secretary Bob and discussed their recent dealings with President Carol." This is different from saying "This information was obtained by tapping Secretary Bob's Skype account", which in turn is different from saying "The NSA can tap Skype accounts." Most of what we've been seeing in the news is stuff like "The NSA can tap <technology>", and occasionally "the NSA spied on <person/group/country>" rather than "the NSA obtained <specific information> from <specific person> on <specific date>", which is what we're seeing with the recent Wikileaks disclosures.
